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Inductive learning from limited observations is a cognitive capacity of 18 
fundamental importance. In humans, it is underwritten by our intuitive statistics, the 19 
ability to draw systematic inferences from populations to randomly drawn samples and 20 
vice versa. According to recent research in cognitive development, human intuitive 21 
statistics develops early in infancy. Recent work in comparative psychology has 22 
produced first evidence for analogous cognitive capacities in great apes who flexibly 23 
drew inferences from populations to samples. In the present study, we investigated 24 
whether great apes (Pongo abelii, Pan troglodytes, Pan paniscus, Gorilla gorilla) also 25 
draw inductive inferences in the opposite direction, from samples to populations. In two 26 
experiments, apes saw an experimenter randomly drawing one multi-item sample from 27 
each of two populations of food items. The populations differed in their proportion of 28 
preferred to neutral items (24:6 vs. 6:24) but apes saw only the distribution of food 29 
items in the samples that reflected the distribution of the respective populations (e.g. 4:1 30 
vs. 1:4). Based on this observation they were then allowed to choose between the two 31 
populations. Results show that apes seemed to make inferences from samples to 32 
populations and thus chose the population from which the more favorable (4:1) sample 33 
was drawn in Experiment 1. In this experiment, the more attractive sample not only 34 
contained proportionally but also absolutely more preferred food items than the less 35 
attractive sample. Experiment 2, however, revealed that when absolute and relative 36 
frequencies were disentangled, apes performed at chance level. Whether these 37 
limitations in apes’ performance reflect true limits of cognitive competence or merely 38 
performance limitations due to accessory task demands is still an open question. 39 
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Introduction 42 
Making general inferences from limited data is one of the key components of 43 
human inductive learning [see e.g. Skyrms, 1975; Holland, 1986; Tenenbaum et al. , 44 
2006; Denison and Xu, 2012]. Traditionally, statistical reasoning was deemed to be 45 
difficult and error-prone [e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Tversky and Kahneman, 46 
1981; Cosmides and Tooby, 1996] and dependent on language and formal education 47 
[e.g. Piaget and Inhelder, 1975]. However, recent studies suggest that even very young 48 
human infants have an astonishingly broad understanding of statistical relations: They 49 
are able to generalize from small samples to larger populations [Xu and Garcia, 2008; 50 
Denison et al. , 2013], make predictions about single event probabilities [e.g. Teglas et 51 
al. , 2007] and use these predictions to guide their search for desired objects [Feigenson 52 
et al. , 2002; Denison and Xu, 2010b; Denison and Xu, 2014]. In one remarkable study, 53 
for example, infants were confronted with two jars containing mixtures of preferred and 54 
non-preferred types of candy [Denison and Xu, 2010b]. After they had watched the 55 
experimenter randomly sampling one piece of candy from each jar and placing it in an 56 
occluded cup, most infants searched in the cup that contained a sample from the jar with 57 
a higher proportion of their preferred candy [Denison and Xu, 2010b]. Hence, infants 58 
seem to have used the proportional information provided by the populations to reason 59 
about the samples. Moreover, infants can integrate probabilistic information with 60 
information from other domains such as intuitive physics or intuitive psychology [Xu 61 
and Denison 2009; Teglas et al. , 2011; Denison et al. , 2014]. For example, infants 62 




understand that a preference of the experimenter for a certain type of object can turn a 63 
sampling process into a non-random event. If the same experimenter, however, is 64 
blindfolded, infants expect the sampled objects to reflect the proportions within 65 
populations [Xu and Denison 2009]. These findings imply that at least at the age of 6 66 
months, humans already flexibly use intuitive statistics to predict the outcome of events. 67 
Being apparently independent of language or formal education, this raises the question 68 
whether these kinds of probabilistic reasoning represent an evolutionary ancient trait 69 
that is shared with other species. 70 
Many species are capable of numerical cognition: For example, great apes [e.g.   71 
Boysen and Berntson, 1989; Call, 2000; Hanus and Call, 2007; Beran et al. , 2013], old- 72 
and new-world monkeys [e.g. Beran et al. , 2008; Barnard et al. , 2013; Beran and 73 
Parrish, 2016], elephants [Perdue et al. , 2012], bears [Vonk and Beran, 2012], raccoons 74 
[Davis, 1984], dogs [Ward and Smuts, 2007], cats [Pisa and Agrillo, 2009], birds [e.g. 75 
Rugani et al. , 2013], fish [e.g. Potrich et al. , 2015], and even insects [bees: Dacke and 76 
Srinivasan, 2008; ants: Reznikova and Ryabko, 2011] are able to compare quantities, 77 
suggesting that representing numerosity is an evolutionary ancient trait. The practical 78 
advantages of such a capacity are obvious: in the context of foraging, for example, 79 
comparing quantities is a highly useful tool to identify the most profitable feeding 80 
location [see e.g. Farnsworth and Smolinski, 2006 and Hunt et al. , 2008 for field 81 
experiments on quantity discrimination in a foraging context]. In the context of 82 
competition comparing ones´ own group size with that of a rival group can help to 83 
estimate the chances of winning a potential fight [e.g. McComb et al. , 1994; Wilson et 84 
al. , 2002; Benson-Amram et al. , 2011]. Chimpanzees, for example, have been found to 85 




attack an opponent group only if their own group outnumbers those of their conspecifics 86 
by at least 1.5 [Wilson et al. , 2002]. 87 
Relatedly, one can imagine that in some situations it would make sense for an 88 
animal to be able to make probability judgments instead of straightforward quantity 89 
comparisons. Efficient foraging, for instance, requires an individual to search for food 90 
in locations that most likely provide the best payoff in relation to foraging time [Geary 91 
et al. , 2015; for a review about optimal foraging theory see e.g. Hamilton, 2010]. One 92 
possibility to identify the best payoff per time unit is to use the relative frequency of 93 
past successes in a feeding location. Imagine a group of chimpanzees that has to decide 94 
in the morning in which direction to go: Either towards feeding ground A or towards 95 
feeding ground B. The apes might want to compare the proportion of times they visited 96 
each feeding ground and obtained a sufficient amount of food instead of simply 97 
comparing the absolute number of times they were successful in each location. Hence, 98 
non-human animals could clearly benefit from an ability exceeding a mere estimation of 99 
absolute or relative numerosity, namely a sense for probabilistic relations, i.e. intuitive 100 
statistics.  Future research will need to investigate both when and due to which selection 101 
pressures intuitive statistics evolved. 102 
A recent comparative study investigated intuitive statistical abilities in non-103 
human great apes with the same kinds of methods used in infancy research [Rakoczy et 104 
al. , 2014]. Individuals of four great ape species were presented with two populations of 105 
food items. Both populations consisted of the same two types of food (one type clearly 106 
preferred over the other) but with different relative frequency distributions. The 107 
experimenter drew a one-object-sample from each population and gave the subject a 108 




choice between the two hidden samples. Hence, subjects had to infer which population 109 
was more likely to yield a preferred food item as a sample. Interestingly, individuals of 110 
all tested great ape species were able to form correct expectations about the probability 111 
of the sampling events, even when absolute and relative frequencies within the 112 
populations were disentangled. Apes´ inferences were, therefore, not only based on 113 
information about absolute frequency, but instead they were truly based on probabilistic 114 
information. Most recently, another representative of the primate order was tested in the 115 
same paradigm: Capuchin monkeys Sapajus sp [Tecwyn et al. , 2016]. In a series of 116 
four experiments, the monkeys were allowed to choose between the randomly drawn 117 
samples of two populations of food items with different proportions of preferred and 118 
non-preferred food. Results revealed that a few individuals might have drawn 119 
probabilistic inferences based on proportional information (control conditions excluded 120 
the usage of simpler choice heuristics). However, monkeys´ performance in a baseline 121 
control condition was unexpectedly low, questioning whether they truly fully 122 
understood the procedure. It remains, therefore, an open question whether primates 123 
other than great apes are capable of intuitive statistics.   124 
Although the findings of Rakoczy and colleagues [2014] raised the possibility 125 
that apes and human infants may operate with the same cognitive capacities for intuitive 126 
statistics, it leaves many open questions for future research. One fundamentally 127 
important question is whether apes’ intuitive statistics reveal the same kinds of 128 
flexibility and generality as those found in human infants. In particular, does their 129 
ability to form expectations about samples randomly drawn from populations (inference 130 
population → sample; Rakoczy et al. 2014) extend to the ability to reason from a given 131 
sample to the corresponding population (inference sample → population)? 132 




In human infants, this question was addressed using the violation of expectation 133 
(VOE) looking-time paradigm [Xu and Garcia, 2008; Denison et al. , 2013].  In one 134 
study [Xu and Garcia 2008] eight-month-old infants were presented with boxes 135 
containing populations of red and white Ping-Pong balls. The distribution of red to 136 
white balls was either 9:1 or 1:9. During test-trials, the box containing one of the two 137 
populations of Ping-Pong balls was covered and the infants watched the experimenter 138 
drawing (apparently randomly) a sample of either 4 red and 1 white Ping-Pong balls or 139 
1 red and 4 white Ping-Pong balls. Subsequently, the experimenter removed the cover 140 
of the box she had drawn from and revealed the population. Infants looked longer at the 141 
“mostly red”- sample when it was drawn from the “mostly white” population 142 
(unexpected) than when it was drawn from the “mostly red” population (expected). The 143 
analogue was true for the “mostly white”-sample. In a control condition it could be 144 
ruled out that infants simply reacted to the perceptual mismatch between sample and 145 
population: Instead of drawing the balls as samples from the box, the experimenter 146 
pulled them out of her pocked and placed them next to the box, resulting in equal 147 
looking-times at both matched and mismatched outcomes. This implies that, confronted 148 
with a sample, infants were able to make inferences about the associated population. 149 
Applying the same paradigm, a second study [Denison et al. 2013] showed that even 6-150 
month-old infants had intuitions about relationships between samples and populations, 151 
suggesting that the ability to make inferences based on samples develops very early in 152 
human ontogeny. The results of these two infant studies [Xu and Garcia, 2008; Denison 153 
et al. , 2013] together with the findings of the first study on intuitive statistics in great 154 
apes [Rakoczy et al. , 2014] may indicate that the capacity of making inductive 155 
inferences is shared with other non-human species. 156 




In the current study we tested great apes’ ability to reason from samples to 157 
populations. Combining the methodology of Rakoczy et al. [2014] and Xu and Garcia 158 
[2008], we confronted apes with two covered containers holding populations of food 159 
items that differed in their proportion of preferred to neutral food (24:6 vs. 6:24). In two 160 
experiments, the apes witnessed the experimenter drawing one multi-item sample from 161 
each population. The distribution within the multi-item samples reflected the 162 
distribution of the respective populations (e.g. 4:1 vs. 1:4). Based on the observation of 163 
these representative samples, the apes were allowed to choose between the two covered 164 
populations. Hence, to receive the more favorable population, they were required to use 165 
proportional information provided by the samples. In Experiment 1 we tested whether 166 
apes were able to reason from samples to populations. In the crucial 4:1 vs. 1:4 Test 167 
condition, apes were confronted with two populations (24:6 vs. 6:24) and watched the 168 
samples 4:1 vs. 1:4 being drawn from them. Two control conditions were designed to 169 
rule out alternative explanations. In Control condition 1 apes did not see the available 170 
populations beforehand. This manipulation tested whether the information provided by 171 
the samples alone was sufficient for the apes to infer about the distribution within the 172 
populations. In Control condition 2, the samples were not re-inserted into the 173 
populations after the drawing process. This manipulation tested whether apes’ success 174 
in previous conditions might have reflected a tendency to choose the population where 175 
the more favorable sample was inserted, without necessarily having to reason about the 176 
drawing process. In Experiment 2, apes were tested in two further Test conditions in 177 
which absolute and relative frequencies of preferred food items within samples were 178 
disentangled: In the 2:1 vs. 4:8 Test condition, the absolute number of preferred food 179 
items was lower in the sample drawn from the more favorable population and therefore 180 




misleading. In the 4:1 vs. 4:8 Test condition, the absolute number of preferred food 181 
items was the same in both samples and therefore inconclusive. Hence, to receive the 182 
more favorable population in Experiment 2, apes had to take into account proportions, 183 
rather than absolute numbers.  184 
Experiment 1: Can apes reason from samples to populations? 185 
In this experiment we sought to investigate whether apes were able to reason from 186 
multi-item samples to populations. In the Test condition, the experimenter presented the 187 
apes with two covered containers holding populations of food items (24:6 vs. 6:24). 188 
After watching representative samples being drawn from those populations (4:1 vs. 1:4), 189 
subjects were allowed to choose between the two containers. Two control conditions 190 
tested (1) whether apes inferred from the samples alone which distribution the 191 
populations had and (2) ruled out that subjects used the simple heuristic of choosing the 192 
container where the more attractive sample was inserted after the sampling process (see 193 
Fig 1 for an illustration of the different Test conditions). Based on the results of 194 
Rakoczy et al. [2014] we expected no inter-specific differences.  195 
Methods 196 
Subjects 197 
Twenty-six individuals (female N = 20) of four great ape species participated: 198 
Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla, N = 4), Bonobos (Pan paniscus, N = 6), Chimpanzees (Pan 199 
troglodytes, N = 10) and Orangutans (Pongo abelii, N = 6). One further chimpanzee 200 
was tested but excluded from data analysis since he did not complete all sessions due to 201 
lack of motivation. Subjects were housed at the Wolfgang Koehler Primate Research 202 




Center (WKPRC) in the Leipzig Zoo and were tested between November 2014 and 203 
September 2015. Their age ranged between six and 48 years (Mean = 18 years) and 204 
about 25% were hand-reared. The remaining 75% were mother-reared (see Table 1 for 205 
more subject information). All apes were already experienced in participating in 206 
cognitive tasks with food-rewards as reinforcement. To control for potential order 207 
effects, 15 of the subjects underwent Experiment 1 first and then proceeded to 208 
Experiment 2, the remaining 11 subjects experienced Experiment 2 first and were tested 209 
in Experiment 1 afterwards (see Fig 2). 210 
The study was ethically approved by an internal committee at the Max Planck 211 
Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. Research and animal husbandry comply with 212 
the “EAZA Minimum Standards for the Accommodation and Care of Animals in Zoos 213 
and Aquaria”, the “EEP Bonobo Husbandry Manual”, the “WAZA Ethical Guidelines 214 
for the Conduct of Research on Animals by Zoos and Aquariums” and the “Guidelines 215 
for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioral Research and Teaching” of the Association 216 
for the Study of Animal Behavior (ASAB). This research adhered to the American 217 
Society of Primatologists principles for the ethical treatment of primates. 218 
Materials 219 
Subjects were tested individually in their sleeping cages or in special test cages. 220 
A Plexiglas panel fitted on the cage mesh separated ape and experimenter. The panel 221 
had two small holes (ᴓ 2 cm; distance between holes 59 cm) through which subjects 222 
could insert a finger to indicate a choice. Perpendicular to the Plexiglas panel, a sliding 223 
table (45 x 79 cm) was mounted on the cage and could be moved both towards the 224 
subject and the experimenter. Underneath the table there were two small concealed 225 




compartments in which food items could be hidden prior to each test trial without the 226 
subject noticing it. To prevent subjects from watching, e.g. preparation of a trial, a 227 
screen (27 x 79 cm) could be fixed via metal brackets at the end of the table closer to 228 
the ape’s side. During test trials, apes were presented with two transparent Plexiglas 229 
containers (ᴓ 8 cm), each containing a population of food items, namely pieces of fruit 230 
pellets and pieces of carrots of roughly equal shape and size. The containers could be 231 
covered with opaque occluders of the same diameter that prevented subjects from seeing 232 
the content of the containers (see Fig 3 for an illustration of the setup). 233 
Design and Procedure 234 
Before the actual test started, subjects underwent a familiarization session. 235 
Subsequently, we carried out one test and two control conditions to investigate whether 236 
apes were able to reason from multi-item samples to populations. All conditions 237 
consisted of 12 test trials, divided into three sessions. Each session started with two 238 
preference trials with single pellet and carrot pieces (see below). Thus, each session 239 
consisted of two preference trials and four test trials.  240 
Familiarization 241 
Each subject that had not experienced Experiment 2 before received one session 242 
with six trials of familiarization. In this session, the ape was confronted with one 243 
transparent container holding a population of carrot and pellet pieces (distribution 244 
12:12). The experimenter presented the container to the ape, shook it several times to 245 
give a good overview of the population and subsequently placed it in the center of the 246 
sliding table. During the first three trials the subject watched the experimenter drawing a 247 
random sample (three to five items) out of the population, presenting it on the palm of 248 




the hand, and re-inserting it into the container. After that, the experimenter moved the 249 
container to the edge of the table and pushed the sliding table forward, so that the ape 250 
could point to the container. Subsequently, the subject received the content of the 251 
container as reward. During the last three trials of familiarization, the procedure was the 252 
same as explained above, but this time the container was placed in an opaque occluder 253 
after the ape had seen the population. Thus, the subject did not see the population during 254 
the sampling process and when pointing to it. The familiarization should ensure that 255 
subjects were familiar with the material and that they understood that “inserting a hand 256 
in an occluded container” meant that a sample was drawn from the contained 257 
population. 258 
Preference trials 259 
The preference trials aimed at assuring the apes’ constant preference for one of 260 
the two single-item types and were conducted prior to each of the test sessions. In each 261 
trial the experimenter placed one pellet piece and one carrot piece on the sliding table 262 
close to the Plexiglas panel, directly in front of the holes. The side on which the pellet 263 
piece was positioned was counterbalanced. Apes indicated their choice with their finger 264 
and immediately received the selected food item as reinforcement. Subsequently, the 265 
test trials of the respective condition were conducted. The criterion for an ape to be 266 
included in the analysis was choosing the pellet piece in at least 75% of the trials. 267 
Test trials 268 
All apes participated in three conditions. To control for a possible effect of 269 
order, 15 subjects were tested in the first order of conditions (Test condition - Control 1 270 
- Control 2). The remaining eleven subjects were tested in the reverse order of 271 




conditions (Control 2 - Control 1 – Test condition). When we decided to split up 272 
subjects in the two groups of orders, all gorillas had already been tested in the first order 273 
of conditions. Thus, order was counterbalanced across subjects for all species except for 274 
the four gorillas, which were all tested in the original order of conditions (see Table 1 275 
for information about the order of conditions each subject experienced). In all 276 
conditions, the populations consisted of 30 items each: Population A was composed of 277 
24 pellet pieces and 6 carrot pieces; population B was composed of 6 pellet pieces and 278 
24 carrot pieces. (These ratios were chosen because Rakoczy et al. [2014] showed that 279 
apes can reliably discriminate between multiples of the ratio 4:1 vs. 1:4. To not exceed 280 
the upper limit of caloric intake recommended for the apes, we had to limit the absolute 281 
number of food items to a certain extent. This limitation also reduced the risk of 282 
satiation and thereby helped to keep up apes´ motivation over the course of trials). 283 
Test 4:1 vs. 1:4:  In this condition the samples reflected the distribution of the 284 
populations one-to-one. More specifically, the sample apparently drawn from 285 
population A (24 pellets : 6 carrots) consisted of 4 pellet and 1 carrot pieces, and the 286 
sample apparently drawn from population B (6 pellets : 24 carrots) consisted of 1 pellet 287 
and 4 carrot pieces. Before a trial started, the experimenter fixed the screen on the table 288 
to prevent the subject from watching preparations. Subsequently, she positioned the pre-289 
prepared multi-item samples in the small compartments underneath the table. The two 290 
containers holding the populations were placed next to each other in the center of the 291 
table and the two opaque occluders were positioned over them.  292 
The trial started when the screen was removed from the sliding table unblocking 293 
the view over the table for the subject. The experimenter simultaneously removed the 294 




two occluders from the containers, and subsequently showed each population to the ape 295 
by lifting the container, tilting it forward and shaking it slightly. After the subject had 296 
seen both populations, the experimenter repositioned the occluders over the containers 297 
and put the screen back into the metal brackets. Then she shuffled both containers.  298 
Hence, subjects knew the two available populations, but did not know which population 299 
was which. Revealing the populations at the beginning of each trial ensured that apes 300 
were aware of both containers holding a relatively high number of food items (higher 301 
than the number of items subsequently drawn). During the shuffling process, the 302 
experimenter reached into the two compartments underneath the table, retrieved the 303 
hidden samples and put them into her fists to make sure that the subject did not see them 304 
there. After removing the screen again, the experimenter pretended to draw 305 
simultaneously out of each population by inserting her fists into the two covered 306 
containers and moving them around while looking upwards (maintaining a pretence of 307 
random drawing). While the subject was watching, she simultaneously removed both 308 
hands out of the containers and presented the samples on the palms of her hands close to 309 
the Plexiglas panel saying “look!”. After the ape had seen both samples, the 310 
experimenter let them fall back into the containers. Subsequently, the experimenter 311 
closed her eyes to minimize unintended cueing and pushed the sliding table slightly 312 
forward so that each container, covered by an occluder, was positioned directly in front 313 
of one of the holes. By inserting a finger into one of the holes, the ape could indicate her 314 
choice, which was coded live by the experimenter after she had opened her eyes again. 315 
In cases where the subject pointed towards both containers, the sliding table was pulled 316 
backwards with the words “just one”, and then pushed forward again, giving the ape a 317 
new choice between the populations. After the ape had made her decision, the occluder 318 




of the chosen container was removed, revealing the selected population. Finally, the 319 
subject received the chosen population (see Fig 1 for an illustration of the procedure). 320 
Control 1: Samples as only source of information. To investigate whether apes were 321 
able to infer from the samples alone which distribution the populations most likely had, 322 
we carried out Control 1, in which the subjects did not see the available populations 323 
prior to the sampling process. The procedure of Control 1 was the same as in the Test 324 
condition, with the following exception: In the beginning of the trials, the experimenter 325 
did not remove the two occluders from the containers, preventing the apes from seeing 326 
the two available populations. Instead, she shook the containers with the occluders 327 
consecutively, making sure that the apes were aware of something being in the 328 
containers, but leaving them in uncertainty about the exact content (see Fig 1 for an 329 
illustration of the procedure). 330 
Control 2: No replacement of samples. One alternative explanation for subjects 331 
succeeding in the Test condition as well as in Control 1 could be that apes did not make 332 
inferences about the drawing process and the populations as a whole, but based their 333 
choices on the side where the “more attractive” sample was inserted. More specifically, 334 
apes could have tracked their preferred sample and chosen the population in which this 335 
sample was dropped in. To rule that out, we conducted Control 2, in which the samples 336 
were not re-inserted into the populations. The procedure was the same as in the Test 337 
condition, but instead of letting the samples fall back into the containers, the 338 
experimenter threw them away in a bucket next to the table. Thus, the apes were 339 
prevented from basing their choice on the side where the “more attractive” sample was 340 




inserted and could instead use the samples only as a hint for the composition of the 341 
populations (see Fig 1 for an illustration of the procedure). 342 
Follow-up tests 343 
A pre-requisite for the correct interpretation of results was that apes recognized 344 
and had a preference for the population containing a higher proportion of pellet pieces. 345 
Therefore we conducted two follow-up tests. Each of them was tested within a single 346 
session consisting of four trials. Note that the follow-up tests were the last conditions 347 
subjects underwent in this study, i.e. individuals that underwent Experiment 1 first, were 348 
tested in the follow-up tests after completion of Experiment 2. Subjects that were tested 349 
in Experiment 2 first, received the follow-up tests after completion of Experiment 1 (see 350 
Fig 2). This was to ensure that none of the subjects had any prior experience regarding 351 
the populations before starting the test. 352 
 “Open population”-test: In the “open population” test, apes were presented with the 353 
same populations as during test conditions (A 24:6; B 6:24). For each trial, populations 354 
were placed in transparent containers standing next to each other in the center of the 355 
sliding table. The experimenter shook both containers successively and tilted them 356 
forward to give a full view of the available populations. Once the ape had seen both 357 
populations, the experimenter positioned the containers on the edge of the sliding table, 358 
each in front of one of the holes. Subsequently, she pushed the table forward and the ape 359 
could indicate her choice by pointing through one of the holes and received the content 360 
of the chosen container. The criterion for an ape to be included in the analysis was 361 
choosing the population containing more pellets in at least 75% of trials.  362 




“Covered population”-test: The procedure of the “covered population” test was the 363 
same as in the “open population” test, except the fact that the experimenter pulled 364 
opaque occluders on the containers after the subject had seen the content. Thus, when 365 
making a choice, the ape was prevented from seeing the two populations; instead she 366 
had to memorize the position of her preferred population for a few seconds. This second 367 
follow-up test with covered containers was conducted to test for the possibility that 368 
some apes might not have been able to choose the correct container throughout the test 369 
trials due to the fact that it was not visible when the choice had to be made. Subjects 370 
were considered successful when they chose the pellet-population in at least 75% of 371 
trials. Based on previous studies that have shown that apes can solve quantity 372 
discrimination tasks that require encoding and mental comparison of quantities [e.g. 373 
Call, 2000; Beran et al. , 2005], we expected that apes would be able to cope with the 374 
type of stimuli occlusion involved in this test. 375 
Coding and Data Analysis 376 
The apes´ choice was coded live by the experimenter. A second blind observer 377 
coded 25% of the trials from video. Both raters were in excellent agreement (K = 0.95, 378 
N = 168). Data of five subjects (one bonobo, two chimpanzees and two gorillas, see SI 379 
Table 1 for individual data) had to be excluded because those individuals did not reach 380 
criterion in the follow-up tests (see above). No ape had to be excluded on the basis of 381 
the preference trials. Data of all conditions were analyzed separately using R [R Core 382 
Team 2014]. Subjects’ choices were the dependent measure and were defined as 383 
“correct” if the chosen container contained the population with the more favorable ratio 384 
of pellets to carrots (24:6). The apes’ overall performance (percent correct across trials) 385 




was tested against chance level using a two-tailed one-sample t-test (R function t.test). 386 
The effect sizes were obtained applying the package “lsr” [Navarro 2015]. In addition, 387 
we tested apes’ first trial performance against chance level using an exact binomial test 388 
(R function binom.test) to detect potential learning effects. In order to test whether 389 
performance differed between species we used a one-way ANOVA (R function aov). 390 
This was justified as residuals were normally distributed and homogenous as verified by 391 
visual inspection of residuals plotted against fitted values and qqplot. For Tukey’s post-392 
hoc test we used the R function TukeyHSD. 393 
Results and discussion 394 
Test 4:1 vs. 1:4 395 
Apes as a group chose the more favorable population on average on 72 % of 396 
trials (see Fig 4 and supplementary material Table 1 for individual data), significantly 397 
more often than predicted by chance (t (20) = 6.12, P < 0.001, 95% CI [0.64, 0.79], N = 398 
21; Cohen’s d = 1.34). This pattern was also visible in the first trial performance (Mean 399 
= 71 %; Binomial test: P = 0.04, N = 21; Cohen’s g = 0.43). Hence, the apes’ 400 
performance seems to reflect an intuitive capacity rather than a learning effect. We 401 
detected no difference between species (ANOVA: F (3, 17) = 0.2, df = 3,P = 0.895). 402 
These results suggest that all tested species of great apes were able to intuitively use the 403 
information provided by the samples to receive the preferred population, therefore 404 
giving a first hint towards apes being able to reason from samples to populations.   405 
Control 1: Samples as only source of information 406 




Apes as a group chose the more favorable population on average on 69 % of 407 
trials (see Fig 4 and supplementary material Table 1 for individual data), which is 408 
significantly above chance level (t (20) = 5.20, P < 0.001, 95% CI [0.62, 0.77], N = 21; 409 
Cohen’s d = 1.13). However, this pattern was not found considering only the 410 
performance in the first trial (Mean = 52 %; Binomial test: P = 0.5, N = 21). This is 411 
perhaps best explained by insecurity about the available populations. Control 1 was the 412 
only condition in which subjects did not know the two possible answers (i.e. the two 413 
available populations) before making their decision. Hence, in the very first trial they 414 
could not be sure whether both populations were of the same size or whether, e.g. the 415 
population associated with the “worse” sample contained four times more items than the 416 
population from which the “better” sample was drawn. Potentially, apes had to 417 
experience during the first trial that, even though they had not seen the containers’ 418 
content, there were two different populations of food items with the same absolute 419 
quantity. This first trial data suggest that subjects did not necessarily expect the 420 
populations to be the same as in other conditions, making it unlikely that subjects had 421 
learned and remembered the composition of the populations during the previous 422 
session(s). We detected no difference between species (ANOVA: F (3, 17) = 0.99, df = 423 
3, P = 0.421). In sum, these results show that the information provided by the samples 424 
was sufficient for the apes to infer about the distribution within the populations. 425 
Control 2: No replacement of samples  426 
Apes as a group chose the more favorable population on average on 66 % of 427 
trials (see Fig 4 supplementary material Table 1 for individual data), which is 428 
significantly more often than expected by chance (t (20) = 4.97, P < 0.001, 95% CI 429 




[0.59, 0.73], N = 21; Cohen’s d = 1.08). This pattern was also reflected in the first trial 430 
performance (Mean = 76 %; Binomial test: P = 0.01, N = 21; Cohen’s g = 0.52) and 431 
thus cannot be due to learning. In this condition we detected differences between 432 
species (ANOVA: F (3, 17) = 4.88, df = 3, P = 0.01, R2 = 0.46). Tukey multiple 433 
comparison of means revealed that bonobos performed significantly worse than gorillas 434 
(Mean bonobos = 53 %, N = 5; Mean gorillas = 88 %, N = 2, P = 0.015). However, 435 
considering the fact that we could only include the data of two gorillas (compared to 436 
five bonobos) in the final analysis, it is questionable whether this result truly reflects 437 
differences between species, or rather random variation or individual differences 438 
between subjects. The findings of Control 2 rule out the possibility that the apes solved 439 
the task by means of a simple heuristic: “choose the container where the more attractive 440 
sample was inserted”. Instead, apes seem to have considered the drawing process and 441 
inferred about the population as a whole.   442 
In sum, the results of Experiment 1 show that all tested species of great apes 443 
were able to use information provided by multi-item samples to track their preferred 444 
populations, and they did so even when they did not know the composition of the 445 
populations beforehand (Control 1) and when samples were not replaced after drawing 446 
(Control 2). These findings suggest that great apes might engage in intuitive statistical 447 
inferences from samples to populations in a comparable way human infants do [Xu and 448 
Garcia 2008; Denison et al. , 2013]. However, an alternative explanation for these 449 
results could be that apes simply associated the preferable sample (i.e. the sample 450 
containing absolutely more pellets), with the container that it was drawn from. To 451 
address this alternative explanation, we tested subjects in Experiment 2 with samples in 452 
which absolute and relative frequencies of pellets were disentangled. 453 





Experiment 2: Do apes take into account relative, rather than absolute 455 
frequencies? 456 
Although results of Experiment 1 tentatively suggest that apes were able to reason from 457 
multi-item samples to populations, it is an open question to what extent the subjects 458 
relied on absolute quantities rather than on proportions to solve the task. More 459 
specifically, in all conditions of Experiment 1, absolute and relative frequencies were 460 
confounded within the samples, i.e. the sample which contained the higher proportion of 461 
preferred food items than the alternative (4:1 vs. 1:4), also contained the higher absolute 462 
quantity of preferred food items (4 vs. 1). Thus, Experiment 1 alone cannot tease apart 463 
whether apes truly compared the proportion of pellets to carrots in both samples (4:1 464 
versus 1:4), or if they based their choice on the absolute amount of pellets (4 vs. 1) and 465 
used the heuristic: “choose the container where more pellets were drawn from”. To 466 
address this question we tested apes in Experiment 2 in two further conditions. In both 467 
of them, absolute and relative frequencies within the samples were arranged in such a 468 
way that apes could not perform above chance level if they focused on absolute 469 
numbers only (see Fig 1 for an illustration of the Test conditions). 470 
Methods 471 
Subjects 472 
The same 26 individuals as in Experiment 1 participated in this experiment. One 473 
additional chimpanzee was tested but excluded from data analysis as he did not 474 
complete all sessions due to a lack of motivation.  475 





We used the same materials as in Experiment 1 (see Fig 3 for an illustration of 477 
the experimental setup). 478 
Design and Procedure 479 
The general procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. To tease apart whether 480 
apes truly compared the proportion of preferred to neutral food items in both samples, 481 
or if they based their choice on the absolute amount of preferred food, we tested apes in 482 
two conditions with varying sample composition. Again, each condition consisted of 12 483 
test trials, divided into three sessions. Prior to the test trials, two preference trials with 484 
single pellet and carrot pieces were carried out. Thus, each session consisted of two 485 
preference trials and four test trials. 486 
Familiarization 487 
Each subject that had not experienced Experiment 1 before received one session 488 
with six trials of familiarization. The procedure of the familiarization phase was exactly 489 
as described for Experiment 1. 490 
Preference trials 491 
The procedure of the preference trials was the same as in Experiment 1. 492 
Test trials 493 
All apes participated in two Test conditions. To control for a possible effect of 494 
order, 15 subjects were tested in the first order of conditions, starting with the 2:1 vs. 495 




4:8 test, through to the 4:1 vs. 4:8 test. The remaining eleven subjects were tested in the 496 
reverse order of conditions (see Table 1 for information about the order of conditions 497 
each subject experienced). Again, in all conditions the populations consisted of 30 items 498 
each: Population A was composed of 24 pellet pieces and 6 carrot pieces; population B 499 
was composed of 6 pellet pieces and 24 carrot pieces.  500 
Test 2:1 vs. 4:8: The procedure was the same as described for the Test condition of 501 
Experiment 1. However, the composition of the samples was varied in such a way that 502 
choosing the container from which the sample with the higher absolute number of 503 
pellets was drawn, resulted in receiving the less attractive population. In particular, the 504 
sample apparently drawn from population A (24 pellets : 6 carrots) consisted of 2 pellet 505 
and 1 carrot pieces, and the sample apparently drawn from population B (6 pellets : 24 506 
carrots) consisted of 4 pellet and 8 carrot pieces. Thus, even though sample B contained 507 
double the amount of pellets compared to sample A, the proportion of pellets to carrots 508 
was more favorable in sample A. If apes´ choice was based on absolute quantities, we 509 
expected them to choose the “wrong“ container more often than the “correct” one. If 510 
they, however, took into account the proportion of pellets to carrots, we expected them 511 
to choose the “correct” container more often than the foil (see Fig 1 for an illustration of 512 
the procedure). 513 
Test 4:1 vs. 4:8: Again, the procedure was the same as described for the Test condition 514 
of Experiment 1.  However, here the composition of the samples was varied in a way 515 
that both samples contained the same absolute number of pellets. More specifically, the 516 
sample apparently drawn from population A (24 pellets : 6 carrots) consisted of 4 pellet 517 
and 1 carrot pieces, and the sample apparently drawn from population B (6 pellets : 24 518 




carrots) consisted of 4 pellet and 8 carrot pieces. Assuming that apes based their choice 519 
on absolute quantities only, we expected them to choose both containers at similar rates, 520 
as the absolute number of pellets did not provide any conclusive information. If they 521 
instead reasoned about the proportion of pellets to carrots, we predicted that they chose 522 
the correct container more often than expected by chance (see Fig 1 for an illustration of 523 
the procedure). 524 
Follow-up tests 525 
Those individuals that underwent Experiment 2 after Experiment 1 received the 526 
two follow-up tests. The procedure was exactly the same as described for Experiment 1. 527 
Coding and Data Analysis 528 
The apes´ choice was coded live by the experimenter. A second blind observer 529 
coded 25% of the trials from video. Both raters were in excellent agreement (K= 0.95, N 530 
= 120). Data of five subjects (one bonobo, two chimpanzees and two gorillas, see SI 531 
Table 1 for individual data) had to be excluded because those individuals did not reach 532 
criterion in the follow-up tests. No further ape had to be excluded on the basis of the 533 
preference trials. Data analysis was the same as described for Experiment 1. 534 
Results and discussion 535 
Test 2:1 vs. 4:8 536 
Apes as a group chose the more favorable population on average on 44 % of 537 
trials (see Fig 4 and supplementary material Table 1 for individual data).  Though this 538 
pattern is not different from what was expected by chance (t (20) = -1.84, P = 0.08, 95% 539 




CI [0.36, 0.51], N = 21), it indicates a (non-significant) trend such that apes tended to 540 
choose the less favorable population more often than the more favorable one. We 541 
detected no differences between species (ANOVA: F (3, 17) = 1.66, df = 3,P = 0.213). 542 
This pattern was also reflected in the first trial performance (Mean = 47 %; Binomial 543 
test: P = 1, N = 21). Hence, all tested species of great apes were unable to extrapolate 544 
from samples to populations, when the absolute number of preferred food-items was 545 
misleading. Instead, they tended to choose the population where the sample with the 546 
higher amount of preferred food-items was drawn from. This finding gives a first hint 547 
that the strategy applied by the apes might have been a comparison of absolute numbers 548 
between samples, rather than an extrapolation of proportions. 549 
Test 4:1 vs. 4:8  550 
Apes as a group chose the more favorable population on average on 51 % of 551 
trials (see Fig 4 and supplementary material Table 1 for individual data), which is not 552 
different from chance level (t (20) = 0.37, P = 0.715, 95% CI [0.44, 0.58], N = 21). We 553 
detected no differences between species (ANOVA: F (3, 17) = 1.35, df = 3, P = 0.292). 554 
The same pattern was found considering only the performance in the first trial (Mean = 555 
43 %; Binomial test: P = 0.664, N = 21). This implies that apes failed to use the 556 
information provided by the samples to reason about the populations and strengthens the 557 
theory that apes might have relied on absolute, rather than relative frequencies. 558 
General discussion 559 
In Experiment 1, we investigated whether great apes are able to reason from 560 
multi-item samples to populations of food items. Results showed that great apes did 561 




extrapolate from samples to populations, irrespective of whether they knew the 562 
composition of the available populations beforehand or not (Control 1) and if samples 563 
were replaced after drawing or not (Control 2). The results of Control 2 are especially 564 
revealing, as they rule out the possibility of a simple heuristic: “choose the container 565 
where the more attractive sample was inserted”. Instead, apes seem to have considered 566 
the drawing process and inferred about the population as a whole from the first trial 567 
onwards. This implies that apes seem to possess similar kinds of capacities as found in 568 
human infants [Xu and Garcia, 2008; Denison et al. , 2013]. In fact, our findings even 569 
go one step further than those of the two existing studies that tested infants’ ability to 570 
reason from sample to population: While the apes in our study drew inferences from 571 
samples to populations in an active choice paradigm, the human infants in the above 572 
mentioned studies were only tested using the VOE looking-time paradigm. There is 573 
some evidence that findings of studies using the VOE looking time paradigm dissociate 574 
from findings of studies using active choice measures [e.g. Ahmed and Ruffman, 1998; 575 
Shinskey and Munakata, 2005; Charles and Rivera, 2009]. This is probably due to the 576 
fact that a subject that is able to perceive something is not necessarily able to act 577 
accordingly. As it is currently unknown whether human infants would succeed in an 578 
active choice paradigm testing for their capacities to reason from sample to population, 579 
we conclude that great apes’ intuitive statistical abilities in this regard seem to be at 580 
least at a comparable level as those of young human infants. However, based on 581 
Experiment 1 alone it is impossible to rule out that apes used alternative strategies based 582 
on the absolute number of preferred food items. The aim of Experiment 2, therefore, 583 
was to investigate whether great apes can successfully reason from samples to 584 
populations when prevented from relying on absolute quantities. Apes performed at 585 




chance level both when the sample drawn from the more favorable population contained 586 
less preferred food items than the sample drawn from the less favorable population, and 587 
when both samples contained the same number of preferred food items. Thus, apes did 588 
not rely on inferences from samples to populations in this experiment. There are at least 589 
two interpretations for these findings. 590 
One interpretation is that apes’ failure in Experiment 2 reflects true limitations of 591 
their cognitive competences. The most obvious difference between Experiment 1 and 2 592 
is that only in the latter subjects could not rely on absolute numbers of preferred food 593 
items. Hence, one could conclude that apes are able to reason and draw inferences about 594 
absolute, but not relative frequencies. Assuming that apes simply compared the absolute 595 
quantity of pellets in both samples and chose the population from which more pellets 596 
were drawn, we expected the following pattern of results: When the number of pellets in 597 
the samples was inconclusive (because it was the same in both samples), apes should 598 
have chosen randomly between both populations. When the number of pellets was 599 
misleading, i.e. higher in the sample drawn from the non-preferred population, apes 600 
should have chosen the “wrong” population more often. While apes indeed chose 601 
randomly between populations when the number of pellets was the same in both 602 
samples, they also did so when the number of pellets was misleading. Yet, it should be 603 
noted that even though there was no significant effect in this condition (misleading 604 
number of pellets in both samples), apes nevertheless revealed a non-significant 605 
tendency to choose the more favorable population less often than the more favorable 606 
one. Consequently, it cannot be ruled out that apes mainly relied on absolute quantities 607 
in this experiment.  608 




This opens up an alternative explanation for the apes´ success in Experiment 1: 609 
Subjects might have not drawn any inference from sample to population, but instead 610 
simply associated the more favorable sample (i.e. the one containing absolutely more 611 
preferred items than the other) with the container it was drawn from, since it was 612 
temporally and spatially most closely associated with that container. In other words, 613 
apes might have followed a heuristic like “chose the container where you saw 614 
something good (i.e. more pellets) coming from”. Future studies need to determine 615 
whether subjects truly relied on associating containers with “better” and “worse”, or if 616 
they in fact perceived the samples as a representation of populations. One possible way 617 
to disentangle the two explanations would entail presenting apes with two opaque 618 
containers filled with two populations of food items (similar to the current study). 619 
Crucially, the experimenter would already have the samples (i.e., pellets and carrots in 620 
4:1 distribution in one hand, 1:4 in the other) in her hands. She would then show the 621 
contents of her hands to the ape, insert her hands into the containers and remove them 622 
again, showing the same items as before. Subsequently, she would discard the 623 
“samples” and give the apes the choice between the two containers.  If apes merely 624 
associated the two containers with “good” or “bad” according to the distribution they 625 
had seen on each side, we would expect them to choose the side where the “sample” 626 
with absolutely more pellets was shown. In contrast, if they recognized a randomly 627 
drawn sample as representation of the population, they should pick both containers 628 
equally often since no drawing took place, and therefore, no inference can be made. 629 
Recall that Rakoczy et al. [2014] showed that great apes did take proportions 630 
into account when reasoning the other way around, i.e. from populations to samples, 631 
ruling out that subjects used a simple association mechanism to solve the task. If our 632 




results reflected true limitations in apes’ cognitive competences, they would, therefore, 633 
suggest that nonhuman primates’ statistical abilities could be unidirectional. This would 634 
question whether apes have a true understanding of drawing processes and the relation 635 
between populations and samples. 636 
A different interpretation for the negative findings of Experiment 2 is that they 637 
may merely reflect performance limitations imposed by the task’s cognitive demands, 638 
which may have masked apes’ true competence. One of these task demands could be the 639 
memory component required by our procedure. At the exact moment when apes were 640 
asked to make a choice, the information necessary to do so (i.e. the samples) was not 641 
available anymore. Instead, apes had to memorize this information for a few seconds 642 
and recall it to choose between the two populations.  Note that this was not the case in 643 
Rakoczy et al. [2014], where subjects were still able to see the populations during their 644 
choice. Even though it may seem trivial to remember information for a few seconds, 645 
results of the follow-up test with covered populations showed that this was indeed a 646 
crucial factor for some of the subjects: Four of the 26 subjects were not able to choose 647 
the more attractive population when it was covered while the decision was made, even 648 
though they showed a clear preference for that population during the preference test 649 
with open populations. Furthermore, other studies have shown the importance of 650 
working memory in different problem solving tasks. For instance, in Seed et al. [2012] 651 
four chimpanzees solved a tool-use task requiring causal inferences when the time-span 652 
over which information had to be memorized was minimized. By contrast, in a related 653 
previous study [Povinelli, 2000] that involved a higher working memory load, all 654 
chimpanzees failed to do so. Although working memory demands, potentially in 655 
combination with lack of attention, may have influenced the apes´ performance to a 656 




certain extent, working memory alone cannot fully explain the fact that apes were not 657 
able to use proportional information in this experiment. Recall that those subjects who 658 
had difficulties remembering the populations’ position were excluded from the analysis 659 
and did therefore not bias the results in a negative way. Moreover, Experiment 1 also 660 
required a memory component, and still subjects succeeded.   661 
Another factor that could have made this task more difficult as compared to 662 
Rakoczy et al. [2014] is the type of inferences required. Retrospective inferences seem 663 
to be harder than prospective ones [Völter and Call, 2017].  This means that going from 664 
samples back to populations (retrospective) may be more demanding than going from 665 
populations forward to samples (prospective). The majority of knowledge that we have 666 
about the origin and development of intuitive statistics derives from the extensive study 667 
of pre-verbal infants. In the last decades, numerous such studies have tested infants both 668 
for their abilities in reasoning from populations to samples as well as from samples to 669 
populations. As mentioned above, to our knowledge there is no study testing pre-verbal 670 
infants for their ability to reason from samples to populations in an active choice 671 
measure. This type of methodology was, so far, only used in studies investigating 672 
infants´ capacity to reason from population to sample [Feigenson et al. , 2002; Denison 673 
and Xu, 2010b; Denison and Xu, 2014]. In these studies, infants were allowed to choose 674 
between the covered samples of two populations of preferred and non-preferred items in 675 
different ratios. Control conditions disentangled absolute and relative frequencies with 676 
the result that infants indeed used proportional information, not a comparison of 677 
absolute quantities, to retrieve their preferred item. The two existing studies 678 
investigating the reverse ability, i.e. reasoning from samples to populations [Xu and 679 
Garcia, 2008; Denison et al. , 2013], both used a VOE looking-time paradigm, a 680 




methodology that is less comparable with the methodology applied for great apes. 681 
Moreover, in both above-mentioned studies probability was confounded with quantity, 682 
and no control condition tested for the fact that infants could have used the shortcut of 683 
focusing on absolute quantities only. As a consequence, it remains unclear whether 684 
reasoning from samples to populations represents a cognitively more challenging task 685 
than the other way around. It would be of great interest to fill that gap of knowledge by 686 
applying an active choice paradigm to investigate pre-verbal infants´ ability to reason 687 
from samples to populations, including a control condition for absolute vs. relative 688 
information.  689 
A third task demand that may have masked apes’ true competence in Experiment 690 
2 is the poorer discriminability of the samples as compared to the samples used in 691 
Experiment 1. As an index for discriminability we calculated the ratio of ratios 692 
(hereafter: ROR) of the two samples for each of the conditions in the following way 693 
[following Drucker et al. , 2016]: 694 
Ratio of pellets to carrots in the sample drawn from the preferred population
Ratio of pellets to carrots in the sample drawn from the non − preferred population
 695 
In all conditions of Experiment 1, the ROR was (4/1)/(1/4)=16 (in Rakoczy et al. 696 
2014 the ROR was ≥ 16 in all conditions). In Experiment 2, the ROR was (2/1)/(4/8)=4 697 
in the 2:1 vs. 4:8 test, and (4/1)/(4/8)=8 in the 4:1 vs. 4:8 test. Thus, in both conditions 698 
of Experiment 2, the ROR was less than or equal to half the one used in Experiment 1. 699 
This discrepancy was caused by our methodological constraints that prevented us from 700 
using larger RORs. More specifically, a larger ROR would have required larger samples 701 
and thus larger populations. As the apes received the whole chosen population as 702 




reinforcement we had to minimize the number of food items within the populations for 703 
the purpose of not exceeding their allowed daily caloric intake. Moreover, given that the 704 
food items were kept in the experimenter´s fist, larger samples would have required a 705 
different sampling method than the one applied here. As a consequence, in this study it 706 
was not possible to disentangle absolute and relative information with the same ROR as 707 
in Experiment 1. Recent research suggests that indeed the magnitude of difference 708 
between two proportions is crucial for non-human primates to discriminate 709 
probabilities. Hanus and Call [2014] presented chimpanzees with two trays, each of 710 
them with a different ratio of hidden food items to potential hiding locations and 711 
therefore a different likelihood of finding food. This study revealed that subjects´ 712 
performance was influenced by the relative difference between the two probabilities as 713 
soon as a certain threshold thereof was reached. Moreover, the apes relied on the ratio 714 
between probabilities, even in conditions where one tray depicted an absolute safe 715 
option— a probability of finding food of 100%. This study emphasizes the importance 716 
of the magnitude of difference between the two ratios to be discriminated, rather than 717 
the magnitude of difference within the single ratios.  718 
With regard to the present study this means the following: Although the 719 
quantities within one sample were presumably easy to discriminate [for reviews about 720 
quantity discrimination see e.g. Feigenson et al. , 2004; Nieder, 2005], it was probably 721 
the ratio between the ratios of both samples that influenced the decision of the apes and 722 
it could well be that the present RORs were simply below the threshold for 723 
discriminating two ratios and thus failed to constitute notable differences. In a study 724 
using a touch screen setup [Drucker et al. , 2016] rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) 725 
were presented with arrays containing different ratios of positive to negative stimuli. 726 




The monkeys learned to choose those arrays with the greater ratio of positive to 727 
negative stimuli and were able to generalize to novel ratios. Similarly as in the 728 
previously mentioned study with chimpanzees [Hanus and Call, 2014], the performance 729 
was directly influenced by the magnitude of difference between the two ratios to be 730 
discriminated. Interestingly, just as human infants [McCrink and Wynn, 2007], the two 731 
macaques tested were able to discriminate a ROR of 2, which is much lower than those 732 
used in our experiments. However, given the fact that those subjects received extensive 733 
training in such discrimination tasks before the actual test, it remains unclear to which 734 
extent those methods are comparable to the ones used here with apes. 735 
Conclusion 736 
The aim of the current study was to investigate whether apes can use samples of 737 
items to infer the composition of the population from where the samples came from.  738 
While apes performed competently when the samples from the more favorable 739 
population were more attractive than the samples from the less favorable population not 740 
only in terms of relative but also in terms of absolute frequencies of preferred over non-741 
preferred food items, they failed to do so when absolute and relative frequencies were 742 
disentangled. The present study, therefore, cannot determine whether non-human 743 
primates engage in intuitive statistical inferences from randomly drawn samples to 744 
populations in a comparable way human infants have recently been found to do [Xu and 745 
Garcia, 2008; Denison et al. , 2013]. It is an open question for future research whether 746 
these limitations in apes’ performance reflect true limits of cognitive competence or 747 
merely performance limitations due to accessory task demands. 748 
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